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iProblem Description
TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) is an ETSI (European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute) standard (ﬁrst published in 1995)
for a mobile communication system designed to be used by law en-
forcement, emergency and rescue service organizations, in public
transportation organizations, and as a general national safety com-
munication network. TETRA systems have been built and are in
operation in more than 100 nations. The main service is voice com-
munications. Some special features are very short call setup time,
push-to-talk group calling mode, and direct terminal-to-terminal ra-
dio transmission. TETRA provides authentication protocols and
both radio channel and end-to-end encryption.
This report will describe the security system of TETRA, includ-
ing the cryptographic primitives used, the authentication and en-
cryption protocols, the key management, and mechanisms provided
for cooperation across security domains. The candidate will perform
a security analysis of the system, by setting up the security assump-
tions, the attacker model, and describe the result of her analysis.
In particular, a formal security analysis of the authentication pro-
tocols could be done. Furthermore, the candidate will attempt to
understand and describe publicly reported technical problems, if
any, pertaining to the communication security of TETRA.
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Abstract
TETRA is designed to be used in private mobile radio environ-
ment, and PMR users have a requirement for high level of security.
Security takes a number of diﬀerent forms, both in terms of avail-
ability, reliability of the system and conﬁdentiality of transmitted
information.
This thesis identiﬁed the key security features of TETRA system
which includes authentication, encryption and key management. A
formal security analysis of authentication protocol was made explor-
ing possible attacks during authentication. The automatic security
veriﬁcation tool used in this thesis is Scyther. Inspired by the re-
sult given by Scyther, possible attacks were discussed with diﬀerent
scenarios.
It was concluded that some of the attacks found by Scyther might
not be the most eﬃcient ones due to their complexity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Scope of thesis
TETRA is an ETSI standard for a mobile communication system
designed to be used in private mobile radio environment as a gen-
eral national safety communication network. This thesis is going to
identify the key security features of TETRA system which include
authentication, encryption and key management. In particular, the
thesis focuses on analyzing the authentication protocol. A formal
security analysis of authentication protocol will be done. The con-
sequences of possible attacks will be discussed and attack scenarios
will be provided.
1.2 Work methods used
Background knowledge was studied from relevant literature and
books. The security protocols were studies from ETSI standards.
3
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The Scyther tool is used to analysis the TETRA authentication
protocol. It is a tool used for automatic veriﬁcation of security pro-
tocols.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is written at a level that expects the reader to have gen-
eral technical understanding of telecommunication networks. Some
background knowledge of information security is required. This the-
sis content ﬁve parts, and each part includes one or more chapters.
The depth and detail varies from section to section, and some parts
are covered into more details than others.
• PartI Introduction
• PartII Background information of TETRA system
This part will cover services provided by TETRA system and
architecture of TETRA networks.
• Part III Security features of TETRA
This part will describe security feature of TETRA system in-
cluding authentication, key management, air interface encryp-
tion and end-to-end encryption.
• Part IV Analysis of authentication protocol
This part will cover information of the automatic security pro-
tocol veriﬁcation tool, and present the result of veriﬁcation.
Possible attack scenarios will also be discussed.
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• Part V Conclusion
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Part II
Background
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Chapter 2
Services of TETRA
Trunking, is the technique used in the radio systems to expand the
availability of communication resources. i.e. all users have auto-
matic access to all channels. Two assumptions of the system is that
the average message is short and many stations need to communi-
cate simultaneously is not likely to happen[1].
The TETRA standard supports three types of trunking meth-
ods: message trunking, transmission trunking and qusi-transmission
trunking [2]. In message trunking, a radio channel is assigned for the
entire duration of the conversation while in transmission trunking a
radio channel is assigned only for the duration of a single half-duplex
radio transmission. Since each transmission in a message must ob-
tain a new voice channel, the subscriber may experience delays in
busy hours. In qusi-transmission trunked system the requests from
a recently terminated group have higher priority over other requests
[1]. This mechanism guarantees message continuity for end users.
9
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TETRA is a standard developed by ETSI for Private Mobile
Radio (PMR) environment. It operates in the frequency range from
150 MHz to 900MHz and it is capable to oﬀering a bit rate up to
28.8 kb/s [2].
2.1 Services of the TETRA System
ETSI speciﬁed three operation modes for TETRA[3]:
• Circuit mode (Voice plus Data) (ETS 300 392 series), that pro-
vide circuit switched speech and data transmission.
• Packet Data Optimized (PDO) (ETS 300 393 series), that pro-
vide data traﬃc based on packet switching.
• Direct Mode Operation (DMO) (ETS 300 396 series), where
voice transmission between two terminals without using a net-
work.
TETRA services can be divided into teleservices and bearer services
[2]:
• Bearer services provide information transfer between network
interfaces using only low layer functions.
• Teleservices provide complete capability for communication in-
cluding terminal functions.
Some of the main Bearer services include [3]:
• User Status Transmission used to transfer short, predeﬁned
messages from user to the dispatching control or vice versa.
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• Short Data Service transmits short text messages between
users comparable to SMS in GSM.
• Circuit Switched Data Services in unprotected mode or
encryption mode.
• Packet Switched Data Services based on TCP/IP or X.25
protocol.
Some of the main Teleservices include [4]:
• Individual call Point-to-point connection between two sub-
scribers
• Group call Point-to-multipoint connection between calling
subscriber and a group called through a common group num-
ber. It employs Half-duplex mode through the push-to-talk
switch.
• Broadcast call Point-to-multipoint connection in which the
subscriber group dialed through a broadcast number can only
hear the calling subscriber.
• Acknowledged group call In a group call the presence of the
group members is conﬁrmed to the calling subscriber using an
acknowledgment.
• Direct Mode (DMO) Point-to-point connection between two
mobile terminals without using of the TETRA network.
12 CHAPTER 2. SERVICES OF TETRA
Chapter 3
TETRA Network
Architecture
This chapter introduce interfaces and components in a TETRA net-
work. Architecture of a TETRA network is shown in ﬁgure 3.0.1.
13
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Figure 3.0.1: TETRA network architecture[2, 6]
3.1 Interfaces
The interfaces in a TETRA network are [2]:
• I1 = Radio air interface
• I2 = Line station interface
• I3 = Inter-system interface. This interface allows interconnec-
tion of TETRA networks from diﬀerent manufacturers.
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• I4 = Terminal equipment interface for a mobile station
I4` = Terminal equipment interface for a line station
• I5 = Network management interface
• I6 = Direct mode interface
3.2 Network Components
Functional structure of a TETRA network includes [4]:
• Mobile Station (MS) comprises subscribers physical equip-
ment, a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and a TETRA Equip-
ment Identity (TEI) speciﬁed to each device. TEI is input by
the operator which means a stolen device can be disabled im-
mediately.
• Line Station (LS) has similar structure as a mobile station
but with the switching and management infrastructure con-
nected over ISDN. It provides the same function and services
as a mobile station.
• Switching and Management Infrastructure (SwMI) con-
tains base stations that establish and maintain communication
between mobile stations and line stations over ISDN. It al-
locates channels, switches calls and contains databases with
subscriber's information.
• Network Management Unit provides local and remote man-
agement functionality [2].
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• Gateways interconnect a TETRA network with a non-TETRA
network such as PSTN, ISDN and PDN. Translation or conver-
sion of information formats and communication protocols might
be necessary [2].
3.3 Operation of the TETRA System
3.3.1 Identities
Identities used to distinguish communication parties in a TETRA
network. Equipment is manufactured with the TETRA Equipment
Identity (TEI) which is similar with the International Mobile Equip-
ment Identity (IMEI) used in GSM. The contents of TEI presented
in ﬁgure 3.3.1.
Type Approval Final Assembly Electronic Serial Spare
Code (TAC) Code (FAC) Number (ESN) (SPR)
24 bits 8 bits 24 bits 4 bits
Figure 3.3.1: The TETRA Equipment Identity[22]
The Mobile Network Identity (MNI) identiﬁes diﬀerent TETRA
networks, and base station will broadcast its MNI. The MNI includes
country code and operator information.
The TETRA Subscriber Identity (TSI) is used to relate sub-
scribers with their services and billing. The contents of TSI is shown
in ﬁgure 3.3.2. The subscriber identity module (SIM) is inserted in
terminal equipment. A unique service of TETRA system is group
call. In addition to individual TSI (ITSI), there is also group TSI
(GTSI).
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Mobile Country Mobile Network Short Subscriber
Code (MCC) Code (MNC) Identity (SSI)
10 bits 14 bits 24 bits
Figure 3.3.2: The TETRA Subscriber Identity[22]
3.3.2 Mobility Management
Mobility management in TETRA is similar with that in the GSM.
The home database (HDB) holds information of MSs such as user
identities, cipher keys and subscribed services. In the visited net-
work, authentication take place through HDB, and essential user
information is downloaded to the visitor database (VDB).
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Part III
TETRA Network Security
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Chapter 4
Security Features
This chapter covers a description of security features in TETAR
including authentication, key management and encryption mecha-
nisms.
4.1 Security Requirements
A secure communication network should provide Conﬁdentiality, In-
tegrity, Authentication, Nonrepudiation and Reliability [5].
Conﬁdentiality Only authorized users should have access to the
information being exchanged.
Integrity Only authorized users should be able to modify the in-
formation being exchanged.
Authentication The identity of the sender can be veriﬁed by the
receiver.
21
22 CHAPTER 4. SECURITY FEATURES
Nonrepudiation The sender cannot deny the message he sent.
Reliability The service and resources are available and not denied
to authorized users.
4.2 Authentication in TETRA
Like in other communication systems, authentication is the fun-
damental security service in TETRA. Authentication is the process
that parties participated in the communication proving they are who
they claimed to be. If public key certiﬁcates are used, one's identity
could be proved by the certiﬁcate signed by an authority. When
using symmetric key cryptography, one can only trust parties share
the same secret with him, and only with the same secret can they
communicate. The authentication in TETRA is based on proving
knowledge of the same secret shared between a mobile station and
the authentication centre (AuC).
4.2.1 Authentication Key
Basic Concepts
Two classes of algorithms for cryptography are symmetric key
algorithms and asymmetric key algorithms. In symmetric key algo-
rithms, sender and receiver share the same secret key. When apply
symmetric key algorithms in systems with multiple nodes, a leakage
of secret key at any node will cause the whole system to be insecure.
Therefore periodically update of the secret key is desirable. Block
ciphers and steam ciphers are two types of symmetric encryption
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schemes. Block cipher scheme divided plaintext into ﬁxed-length
"blocks" and encrypt one block at a time [11]. A steam cipher op-
erates with one plaintext digit at a time. A secret key initials the
creation of a pseudorandom sequence (keystream) which will be used
to combine with the plaintext [12].
In asymmetric key (or public key) algorithm, the encryption and
decryption processes are using diﬀerent keys. Public-key cryptog-
raphy makes use of mathematical functions instead of substitution
and permutation and it is computationally infeasible to derive one
of the keys from the cryptographic algorithm and the other key [7].
Each user has a pair of keys, one public key and one private key.
Public key is made public while private key is kept private. When
two parties try to communicate, the sender needs to know the re-
ceiver's public key and encrypt message with it. The receiver can
decrypt the message with its private key.
Authentication Key Generation
Authentication in TETRA uses symmetric keys. The mobile sta-
tion will be assigned an User Authentication Key (UAK) when reg-
ister to the network for the ﬁrst time. The UAK is stored in ter-
minal equipment's SIM card as well as in the authentication centre
database. The authentication key, K, is the knowledge of which has
to be demonstrated for authentication [8]. It could be generated in
three ways shown in Figure 4.2.1. K may be generated from Authen-
tication Code (AC), which is a pin code entered by the user, using
the TB1 algorithm. K may also be generated from UAK stored in
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the SIM card with the algorithm TB2. Using both AC and UAK
to generate K is the third method labeled TB3. The length of K,
KS and KS' are all 128 bits. K will not be used directly in the
authentication process but to generate session keys: KS and KS'.
Figure 4.2.1: Generation of authentication key to MS[8]
4.2.2 Authentication Procedures
In TETRA, authentication services include authentication of MS by
SwMI, authentication of SwMI by MS and mutual authentication
[8]:
Figure 4.2.2 shows the procedure of infrastructure authenticates
a mobile station. The infrastructure may include authentication
centre and base station. RS is a random seed used together with
the authentication key K to generate a session key KS. The algo-
rithm used is TA11, and this procedure will be performed by the
authentication centre of the home system.
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Figure 4.2.2: Authentication of a user[8]
A random number RAND1 is generated by the infrastructure and
sent to the MS as a challenge. The MS will compute its response
RES1 using the session key KS and the algorithm TA12. This proce-
dure also generated DCK1 which is a part of the derived cipher key
(DCK). The infrastructure shall compare RES1 with the expected
response XRES1, and the authentication result R1 will be set to
TRUE or FALSE based on whether RES1 equals XRES1.
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Figure 4.2.3: Authentication of the infrastructure[8]
Figure 4.2.3 indicates the procedure of a MS authenticates the
infrastructure which is similar to the procedure described above.
The algorithms TA11 and TA12 will be replace with TA21 and TA22
respectively. The session key KS' also is diﬀerent from KS. The other
part of the derived cipher key DCK2 will be generated.
The TETRA system supports mutual authentication between the
MS and the infrastructure. The mutual authentication will start
as an one way authentication and the challenged party will decide
whether to made the authentication mutual. The second authenti-
cation will only perform when the ﬁrst authentication is successful.
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Figure 4.2.4: Mutual Authentication Initiated by Infrastructure[8]
Figure 4.2.4 shows the authentication procedure of mutual au-
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thentication initiated by the infrastructure.
• Authentication centre matches user's authentication key K with
its identity ITSI. The authentication key K and a random seed
RS generate a pair of session keys KS and KS' through algo-
rithms TA11 and TA21.
• The session keys and RS are then sent to the base station. Base
station generates a random number RAND1 and sends it to the
MS together with RS.
• MS generates session keys and compute the response RES1
which shall be sent back to the base station. If the user decided
to make the authentication mutual, it will also generate and
send a random number RAND2 to the base station.
• The base station compared RES1 with XRES1, and if the two
values are equal the base station shall compute RES2 using
TA22. Return RES2 and R1 equals TRUE.
• RES2 is compared with XRES2 by the MS and if the same,
the MS will return R2 equals TRUE. Mutual authentication is
completed.
• DCK1 and DCK2 produced during the procedure shall be in-
puts to the algorithm TB4 to generate the derived cipher key
(DCK).
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Figure 4.2.5: Mutual Authentication Initiated by a User[8]
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The mutual authentication initiated by the MS indicated with
ﬁgure 4.2.5. It is very similar with the procedure described above.
4.2.3 Authentication PDUs
As data passing from the user application layer down to layers of
protocols, each layer adds a header containing protocol information.
These headers are called Protocol Data Units (PDUs). The PDUs
used in the TETRA authentication process are shown below [8]:
PDU Type
Authentication Random Challenge Random Seed Proprietary
sub-type (RAND1) (RS) element
4 bits 2 bits 80 bits 80 bits ...
Figure 4.2.6: D-AUTHENTICATION DEMAND[8]
The PDU in ﬁgure 4.2.6 is used by the infrastructure to initiate
an authentication.
PDU Type: D-AUTHENTICATION DEMAND=00012
Authentication sub-type: D-AUTHENTICATION DEMAND=002
Random Challenge (RAND1): an 80-bit number
Random Seed: an 80-bit number
Proprietary element: an optional with variable length for pro-
prietary deﬁned information.
PDU Type
Authentication Response
MAF
Random Proprietary
sub-type
Value Challenge
element
(RES1) (RAND2)
4 bits 2 bits 32 bits 1 bit 80 bits ...
Figure 4.2.7: U-AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE[8]
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The PDU used by the user to response an authentication demand
is shown in ﬁgure 4.2.7.
PDU Type: D-AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE=00002
Authentication sub-type: D-AUTHENTICATION DEMAND=012
Response Value (RES1): an 32-bit value calculated from the
challenge
MAF (Mutual Authentication Flag): a ﬂag indicates the
PDU includes (1) mutual authentication elements or not (0)
Random Challenge (RAND2): an 80-bit number
PDU Type
Authentication Authentication
MAF
Response Value Proprietary
sub-type Result (R1) (RES2) element
4 bits 2 bits 1 bits 1bits 32 bits ...
Figure 4.2.8: D-AUTHENTICATION RESULT[8]
The PDU used by the infrastructure to return the result of au-
thentication is shown in ﬁgure 4.2.8.
PDU Type: D-AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE=11102
Authentication sub-type: D-AUTHENTICATION DEMAND=102
Authentication Result (R1): a ﬂag indicates success (1) or
failure (0) of an authentication
Response Value (RES2): a 32-bit value response to the chal-
lenge when MAF being set
4.2.4 Authentication Algorithm
One available standard set of Authentication and Key Management
Algorithms from the TETRA MoU is TAA1 [16]. It was devel-
oped by the security algorithm group of experts (SAGE) and can
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be obtained under a 'Non-disclosure and restricted usage license'
from ETSI. The rules for the management of the TETRA standard
encryption algorithm TAA1 is speciﬁed in [17].
4.2.5 Analysis of Authentication Protocol
During authentication, the authentication key K is never directly
used or transmitted over the air. Instead, session keys are used in
the authentication. This mechanism protects the authentication key
K.
There are three random numbers involved in the mutual authen-
tication process: RS, RAND1 and RAND2. The use of three random
numbers makes it diﬃcult to perform a message replay attack.
A vulnerability of the authentication protocol is that there is no
data integrity protection of the authentication messages. A false
base station could simply intercept and modify authentication mes-
sages which will cause the authentication fail. Based on the intention
of the attacker, the same basic attack can have diﬀerent eﬀects to
the system and users.
Setting up false base station and modifying authentication mes-
sages of individual users might not seem to be an eﬀective way of
attack. Probably a simpler denial of service attack would be jam-
ming the radio path by sending high power signal on the frequencies
used by TETRA. However, such kind attacks can be easily detected,
false base station could be used to isolate target mobile stations and
prevent them from communication.
The security level of authentication depends highly on algorithms:
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TA11, TA12, TA21 and TA22. As stated in [13] when a MS roams
to another TETRA network, it is not a wise solution to transfer
the authentication key to the visited network. If transfer certain
information that can be used for one single authentication, it might
cause too much overhead in TETRA system. The suggestion is to
transfer a session key that can be used for repeated authentication.
If the transmission channel between authentication centre and the
base station is insecure, the session keys KS and KS' could be inter-
cepted by an attacker. The random seed RS transmitted between
the base station and the mobile station could also be intercepted.
Then a known plaintext attack could be performed where the plain-
text is RS and the ciphertext is KS and KS'. As the attacker collected
enough pairs of RS and KS/KS', he might be able to gain a good
knowledge of the algorithms TA11 and TA21.
4.3 Key Management
4.3.1 Air Interface Key management mechanisms
Keys managed in the TETRA system include [8]:
Derived Cipher Key (DCK)
As mentioned in section 4.2.2, parts of derived cipher key DCK1
and DCK2 are generated after successful authentications. As inputs
of the algorithm TB4, DCK1 and DCK2 derive the DCK. In case
the mutual authentication is not performed, either DCK1 or DCK2
will be missing. The missing value shall be set to zero.
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DCK used to protect the data, voice and signaling transmitted
between the MS and the infrastructure after authentication.
Figure 4.3.1: Distribution of a common cipher key[8]
Common Cipher Key (CCK)
For every Location Area (LA), a common cipher key shall be
generated and distributed to each MS by the infrastructure. DCK
is used in this process as the sealing key; together with algorithm
TA31 the Sealed Common Cipher Key (SCCK) is generated. CCK
Identiﬁer (CCK-id) is distributed along with the key since the in-
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frastructure may update the CCK from time to time. The value of
CCK-id shall be incremented for each new key. The manipulation
ﬂag MF indicates weather a sealed cipher key has been manipulated.
The process is shown in the ﬁgure 4.3.1.
Group Cipher Key (GCK)
The group cipher key is generated and distributed to mobile sta-
tions in a group by the infrastructure. The GCK will not be used
on the air interface directly. It will be modiﬁed by CCK or SCK
to provide a Modiﬁed GCK (MGCK). The algorithm used in this
process is TA71. The MGCK is used for encryption of group calls.
Static Cipher Key (SCK)
The static cipher key is known to both infrastructure and the MS,
the value of SCK shall never change. A terminal could store up to
32 SCKs. The SCK could be used in systems that do not implement
authentication. It could also be used for encryption in the Direct
Mode operations.
4.3.2 Over The Air Re-keying
Over The Air Re-keying (OTAR) is a way the infrastructure transfer
sealed cipher key (CCK, SCK or GCK) to mobile stations over the
air interface. The transfer of CCK and GCK are both protected by
DCK while SCK is sealed with the KSO (Session Key for OTAR) [8].
KSO is generated from a user's authentication key and a random
seed.
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4.4 Encryption
4.4.1 Classes of Security
The TETRA system provides three diﬀerent security classes:
• class 1: No encryption
• class 2: The Static Cipher Key encryption
• class 3: The Dynamic Cipher Key encryption
4.4.2 Air Interface Encryption
Since anyone could listen to air channels during the communication
of MS and BS, it is important to encrypt information transmitted
over the air. Encryption is a method to make sure the intercepted
information is not intelligible to anyone other than intended receiver.
Air interface encryption handled in the upper part of the MAC layer,
and the MAC headers left unencrypted [8].
Air Encryption Process
Air interface encryption realized using an encryption algorithm
implemented in a Key Stream Generator (KGS) [8]. As shown in
ﬁgure 4.4.1, the KGS has two inputs, an Initial Value (IV) and a
cipher key and one output as a Key Stream Segment (KSS). The
ciphertext obtained by modulo-2 addition (XORed) the KSS bits
with plaintext.
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Figure 4.4.1: Speech and control information encryption[8]
The Initial Value (IV) is 29-bit data with composition of slot
number (2 bits), frame number (5 bits), multiframe number (6 bits),
hyper-frames (15 bits) and a ﬁnal bit indicates downlink transmis-
sion (0) or uplink transmission (1).
As shown in ﬁgure 4.4.2 the Encryption Cipher Key (ECK) is
derived from a selected Cipher Key (CK) which could be one of SCK,
DCK, MGCK or CCK [8]. The CK will be modiﬁed by the Carrier
Number (CN), LA-id, and Colour Code (CC) using the algorithm
TB5.
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Figure 4.4.2: Generation of ECK[8]
Air Encryption Algorithm The TETRA encryption algorithm
(TEA) is used on the air interface. The TETRA MoU recommends
a number of possible algorithms [18, 19, 20, 21] for diﬀerent com-
mercial requirements. TEA2 and TEA3 are restricted export algo-
rithms that primarily designed for public safety organizations, while
TEA1 and TEA4 are readily exportable algorithms [16]. The algo-
rithm speciﬁcations can be obtained under a 'Non-disclosure and
restricted usage licence' from ETSI.
4.4.3 End-to-End Encryption
Air interface encryption described above protects the communica-
tion between mobile stations and the base station. The end-to-end
encryption also protects the transmission of the information through
networks (BS to MSC, MSC to MSC and links within the TETRA
infrastructure). Information encrypted by the sender and only be
decrypted by the receiver.
End-to-end encryption and key management are not speciﬁed in
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the TETRA standard. The speciﬁcation [9] only describes the mech-
anism for synchronization shown in the ﬁgure 4.4.3. The TETRA
system does not participate in key generation and management; it
only provides the transmission channels.
Figure 4.4.3: Synchronization [9]
The End-to-end Key Stream Generator (EKSG) generates a key
stream segment EKSS with inputs: CK (cipher key) and IV (initial-
ization value). To prevent "recording and replay", the IV should be
a time variant parameter used to initialize synchronization of the
encryption units.
The function F1 combines the plaintext bit stream with EKSS
producing an encrypted ciphertext bit stream. The inverse of this
process is combined ciphertext bit stream with EKSS through the
function F−11 to get plaintext bit stream.
The function F2 replaces a half slot of the ciphertext bit stream
with a synchronization frame generated from the "Synch Control"
functional unit.
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The function F3 recognizes the synchronization frame and trans-
mits it to the "Synch Detect" functional unit.
4.5 Replay Prevention
Replay attack is a form of attack when adversary intercepts other
user's message and retransmits it [15]. In the wireless network, it
is possible for attacker to sniﬀ packets. Even the attacker could
not get any information from the encrypted messages; he can still
perform attacks by replaying old messages from eligible users. The
most common countermeasures include using sequence numbers or
timestamps. Synchronization of the network needs to be achieved
ﬁrst.
In TETRA, the standard [8] states the importance of having
protection mechanism against replay attack. A time variant ini-
tialization value or a time variant cipher key is suggested to be
used. Examples of using call-id or a shared real time clock to pre-
vent recording and replaying an entire call also mentioned in the
standard. Speciﬁcation of approaches is outside the scope of this
standard.
Part IV
Analysis of the
Authentication Protocol
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Security Protocol
Cryptographic protocols use cryptographic primitives to provide se-
curity communication over insecure networks. It might be easy to
understand a protocol from an informal level; it is extremely diﬃ-
cult for human to correctly verify a protocol due to the complexity
of protocol analysis. Automatic tools are preferred in protocol ana-
lyzing. Some of the best known protocol analysis methods include
BAN logic [23], applied pi calculus [32], strand space approach [34]
and multiset rewriting [35]. Also, there are several automatic tools
for veriﬁcation of security protocols, such as proVerif [36], avispa
[37], CPSA tool [38] and NRL analyser [39]. The Scyther tool is
chosen to analysis the security of TETRA authentication protocol
in this thesis.
5.1 The Scyther Tool
The Scyther tool is designed for automatic veriﬁcation of security
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protocols, and it is freely available for Windows, Linux, and Mac
OS X. It can be downloaded from [24]. The components required
to be installed ﬁrst include the GraphViz library [25], Phthon [26]
and wxPython libraries [27]. The graphical user interface is written
in Python and Scyther starts when executing the scyther-gui.py ﬁle
[28].
5.2 Security Protocol Speciﬁcation
A security protocol speciﬁcation describes the communication par-
ties, the protocol events to be executed, the order of the events and
initial knowledge required for communication parties. The use of the
protocol must follow these "rules" states in a protocol speciﬁcation.
Some basic concepts used in protocol speciﬁcation are [29]:
Roles The protocol analysis model deﬁned in Scyther is a role-
based security protocol model, roles are deﬁned as a number of
behaviours. There might exist several communication agents
in a system and each agent executes instances of one or more
roles. Each instance is called a run. To describe roles, Role
Terms shall be used. The basic term sets are shown in Table
5.1. Variable used to store received value, and fresh denotes
freshly locally generated value. The sk(i) and pk(i) denotes the
secret key and public key of role i in asymmetric encryption,
and k(i,r) denotes the symmetric key shared between role i and
role r.
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Table 5.1: Basic Term Sets[29]
Description Set Typical elements
Role terms RoleTerm rt1, rt2
Variables Var X, Y, Z
Fresh values Fresh sessionkey
Roles Role i, r, s
Functions Func h
Function application h(m)
Long-term keys sk(i), pk(i), k(i,r)
Events The role events are events that can be executed by a role.
Events include sending and receiving of messages and security
claims. For the role R, SendLabel(R, R', rt) denotes R sending rt
to R'. RecvLabel(R,R' rt) denotes R' receive rt sent by R. Each
send and receive event has a label that marks corresponding
send and receive events. ClaimLabel (R, c, rt) or claimLabel(R,
c) denotes the security goal c is expected to hold with optional
parameter rt.
Runs Roles could be executed any number of times by agents, and
execution of a role called a run. Turning a role description into
a run refers to as instantiation. Each run is assigned with a
unique run identiﬁer. Fresh value, roles, and variables that are
local to a run are extended with the run identiﬁer. Table 5.2
indicates basic run term sets.
Table 5.2: Basic Run Sets [29]
Description Set Typical elements
Run terms RunTerm t1,t2
Instantiated constants ni#1,nr#2,sessionkey#1
Agents Agent A,B,C,S,E
46 CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY PROTOCOL
Traces The semantics of a security protocol is expressed as a set of
traces where each trace is an interleaving of a number of runs
[31].
5.3 Security Properties
In Scyther, security properties are integrated into the protocol spec-
iﬁcation by claim events [29]. Claim events happened based on the
local view of each agent, security properties include [29]:
Secrecy ClaimL(R, secret, rt) is a secrecy claim event which de-
notes for the role R, rt should not be known to the adversary.
The deﬁnition of a secrecy claim is true if and only if roles
are mapped to honest agents for each run, and the claimed se-
cret term should not be inferable from the knowledge of the
adversary.
Aliveness The least requirement in authentication is there exist a
communication partner in the network. Generic Aliveness in a
claim event is written as claim (R, alive, R') with role R and R'.
To satisfy generic aliveness with the role R', the agent executing
the role R thinks he is communicating with an trusted agent
and the intended communication partner has actually executed
an event [30].
Synchronisation Base on the basic requirement of aliveness in
communication, synchronisation requires the entire message ex-
change exactly as speciﬁed by the protocol description. Mes-
sages were indeed sent and received by the communication part-
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ner. The cast function was introduced to identify which runs
perform which roles since run events associated with diﬀerent
roles may belong to the same agent.
Ni-Synch Ni-Synch stands for Non-injective Synchronisation. Ni-
Synch property requires that the corresponding send and re-
ceive events (1) are executed by the runs indicated by the cast
function, (2) happened in the correct order, and (3) have the
same contents. Protocol satisfying non-injective synchronisa-
tion may still be suﬀered from message replay attacks in which
case property Injective Synchronisation is introduced.
Ni-Agree Ni-Agree stands for Non-injective Agreement. Agree-
ment ensures the communication parties agree on the value
of variables after execution of the protocol. The diﬀerence
between Non-injective agreement and Non-injective synchro-
nisation is that Ni-Agree focus on the correct contents of the
message while Ni-Synch also requires messages executed in the
expected order. If a protocol satisﬁes synchronisation it satis-
ﬁes agreement also.
5.4 Veriﬁcation Algorithm
According to Cremers and Mauw in the book [29], the algorithm
used by Scyther to analysing the security properties of a proto-
col is based on the analysis of trace patterns. Trace patterns are
introduced to capture the concept of similar behaviours from the
perspective of property veriﬁcation. Trace patterns are deﬁned as
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partially ordered set of symbolic events. The required properties of
traces to evaluate security properties include event order, the equiv-
alence of events and messages, positive occurrence of agent events
and contents of the adversary knowledge.
If there exist traces exhibit attack pattern and violates the se-
curity property, the claimed security property is fail. If there is no
trace exhibits the attack pattern, the security property is hold. Ver-
iﬁcation procedure determines if any trace contents attack patterns.
5.5 Adversary Models
A formal security protocol analysis model should include a descrip-
tion of the adversary's capabilities, and one of the mostly used threat
model is the Dolev and Yao network threat model [40]. In this model
the entire communication network is under complete control of the
adversary. The adversary can replay, remove, split, reroute, reorder,
intercept and learn the content of any messages passing through the
network. The honest communication parties can only send and re-
ceive messages through the adversary. Cryptographic primitives are
assumed to be black boxes, which means only with the knowledge
of keys, can the adversary encrypt and decrypt messages.
The adversary model of Scyther has some additional capabilities
that mentioned in [29]. The adversary is possible to learn the long-
term keys, session keys and random values of an agent.
Chapter 6
Veriﬁcation of TETRA
Authentication Protocol
6.1 TETRA Authentication Protocol Speciﬁca-
tion
Authentication in TETRA involves three parties: the authentication
centre (AuC), the mobile station (MS) and the base station (BS). A
detailed description of the authentication protocol could be found
in the section 4.2. To summaries the messages exchanged between
parties in a mutual authentication:
1. MS→AuC: UserID
2. AuC→BS: RS, KS, KS'
3. BS→MS: RAND1, RS
4. MS→BS: RES1, RAND2
49
50CHAPTER 6. VERIFICATION OF TETRAAUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
5. BS→MS: RES2, R1
6. MS→BS: R2
Assume the communication channel between AuC and BS is secure,
the party AuC and BS can be combined as one role (SwMI). The
simpliﬁed process then becomes like:
1. MS→SwMI: UserID
2. SwMI→MS: RAND1, RS
3. MS→SwMI: RES1, RAND2
4. SwMI→MS: RES2, R1
5. MS→SwMI: R2
Figure 6.1.1 illustrates the protocol speciﬁcation using Message Se-
quence Charts (MSC).
Figure 6.1.1: MSC of TETRA Authentication Protocol
6.1. TETRA AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 51
The security requirements for authentication :
1. For both roles, the long-term shared symmetric key between
MS and SwMI should not be revealed to an adversary. Model
as claim events:
claim_SwMI(SwMI,Secret,k(MS,SwMI));
claim_MS(MS,Secret,k(MS,SwMI));
2. The session keys KS and KS' should not be revealed to an ad-
versary. Model as claim events:
claim_SwMI(SwMI,Secret,TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
claim_SwMI(SwMI,Secret,TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
claim_MS(MS,Secret,TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
claim_MS(MS,Secret,TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
3. The derived cipher key (DCK) should not be revealed to an
adversary. Model as claim events:
claim_SwMI(SwMI,Secret,TB4(TA12b(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND1),
TA22b(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND2)));
claim_MS8(MS,Secret,TB4(TA12b(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND1),
TA22b(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND2)));
4. For both roles, the claim of aliveness should hold.
5. The MS and the SwMI should agree on all the value of variables
exchanged.
6. For both roles the requirement of non-injective synchronisation
should be satisﬁed.
Figure 6.1.2 and ﬁgure 6.1.3 on the next page specify one possible
input to the Scyther tool.
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usertype AuthenticationResult;
const R1: AuthenticationResult;
const R2: AuthenticationResult;
hashfunction TA11, TA12, TA12b, TA21, TA22, TA22b, TB4;
protocol TETRA(SwMI,MS)
{
role SwMI
{
fresh RS: Nonce;
fresh RAND1: Nonce;
var RAND2: Nonce;
recv_1(MS,SwMI, MS);
send_2(SwMI,MS, RAND1, RS);
recv_3(MS,SwMI, TA12(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS), RAND1), RAND2);
send_4(SwMI,MS, TA22(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND2), R1);
recv_5(MS,SwMI, R2); claim(SwMI,Running,MS,R1,R2);
claim_SwMI1(SwMI,Secret,k(MS,SwMI));
claim_SwMI2(SwMI,Secret,TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
claim_SwMI3(SwMI,Secret,TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
claim_SwMI4(SwMI,Niagree);
claim_SwMI5(SwMI,Nisynch);
claim_SwMI6(SwMI, Alive);
claim_SwMI7(SwMI, Weakagree);
claim_SwMI8(SwMI,Secret,TB4(TA12b(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND1),
TA22b(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND2)));
claim_SwMI9(SwMI,Commit,MS,R1,R2);
}
Figure 6.1.2: Example input to the Scyther tool
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role MS
{
var RS: Nonce;
var RAND1: Nonce;
fresh RAND2: Nonce;
send_1(MS,SwMI, MS);
recv_2(SwMI,MS, RAND1, RS);
send_3(MS,SwMI, TA12(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS), RAND1), RAND2);
recv_4(SwMI,MS, TA22(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND2), R1);
claim(MS,Running,SwMI,R1,R2);
send_5(MS,SwMI, R2);
claim_MS1(MS,Secret,k(MS,SwMI));
claim_MS2(MS,Secret,TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
claim_MS3(MS,Secret,TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS));
claim_MS4(MS,Niagree);
claim_MS5(MS, Alive );
claim_MS6(MS, Weakagree );
claim_MS7(MS,Nisynch);
claim_MS8(MS,Secret,TB4(TA12b(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND1),
TA22b(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND2)));
claim_MS9(MS,Commit,SwMI,R1,R2);
}
}
Figure 6.1.3: Example input to the Scyther tool
6.2 Veriﬁcation of TETRA Authentication Pro-
tocol
The security properties are modeled as local claim events, and the
veriﬁcation result from Scyther is shown in ﬁgure 6.2.1. The long-
term shared symmetric key K, the session keys and the derived ci-
pher key DCK are secret. The claim of generic aliveness is satisﬁed
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which means the intended communication partner is alive and ac-
tually executing events. The security property weak agreement is
hold means that the intended communication partner executes an
event during the run in which the claim event occurs [29].
The Scyther tool also has found at least 6 attacks which means
6 security claims do not hold, it also provide user a list of trace
patterns shown in ﬁgure 6.2.2.
Figure 6.2.1: Scyther Veriﬁcation Result
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Figure 6.2.2: Trace patterns
In the perspective of role SwMI, security properties Ni-Synch
and Ni-Agree do not hold, Scyther provides one example attack
illustrated in ﬁgure 6.2.3. In this attack the intruder intercept the
message sent from the MS to the SwMI contenting variables RES1
and RAND2. The intruder selects RES1 and replaces the value of
RAND2 with nonce number generated by him. The SwMI received
the modiﬁed message and believed it was sent from the MS. The
intruder then block the message send from the SwMI to the MS
with parameters RES2 and R1, and forge a reply R2 to the SwMI.
This attack also makes the claim event MS and SwMI agree over
the value of data R1 and R2 fail.
In this attack, the intruder makes the SwMI believe the authen-
tication process has successfully completed while the MS still in the
half way of authentication process waiting for the reply message
from the SwMI. This kind of attack might not be easily identiﬁed
and could aﬀect the availability of the system.
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Figure 6.2.3: Attack 1
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In the perspective of role MS, the security properties Ni-Synch
and the data agreement over R1 and R2 do not hold. The Scyther
tool describes one of the attacks illustrated in ﬁgure 6.2.4. This
is a cutting the ﬁnal message attack where the last message, the
result of authentication in this case, is blocked. If the SwMI under
a mass cutting the ﬁnal message attack, missing notiﬁcations from
terminals, it shall reserve resources for a large number of terminal
users. Such cutting the ﬁnal message attacks are unpreventable.
58CHAPTER 6. VERIFICATION OF TETRAAUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Figure 6.2.4: Attack 2
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In attack 3 shown in ﬁgure 6.2.5, the Ni-agree claim is violated.
The intruder modiﬁes data between diﬀerent sessions of the same
MS user that make the SwMI and the MS believe they have agreed
over the same value when they are actually not. The intruder select
the correct RES1 from the reply message of MS in the ﬁrst session,
and start the second session with MS with the original RS and an
intruder generated random number. Then the intruder shall reply
to the SwMI with the correct RES1 from the ﬁrst session and the
RAND2 from the second session. The SwMI compute the RES2
with RS and RAND2, and send it back to the MS. Both the MS
and the SwMI believe the authentication has successfully complete
but they actually do not have agreement over the value of RAND1
and RES1/XRES1.
Recall the authentication procedure illustrated in ﬁgure 4.2.4, the
processes of compute RES1 and XRES1 at the MS and SwMI side
respectively also generate a value called DCK1. DCK1 shall be used
as one of the inputs to the algorithm TB4 to generate the derived
cipher key (DCK). As mentioned in the section 4.3.1, the DCK shall
be used as air interface encryption key between MS and SwMI after
authentication. Since the value of RES1 is not equals to the value of
XRES1, the values of DCK1 are also diﬀerent. Communication be-
tween the MS and the SwMI after authentication shall be impossible
due to the fact they do not share the same DCK.
The MS and the SwMI might realize they do not share the same
DCK, and they may start another authentication procedure.
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Figure 6.2.5: Attack 3
Chapter 7
Attack Scenarios
Inspired by the result from Scyther, this chapter covers some possi-
ble attacks against TETRA networks.
7.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
In a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, the attacker attempts to make
the network resources unavailable to its honest users, and one com-
mon method is saturating target with external communication re-
quest to exhaust its capability [10].
Jamming
Radio jamming is a way of disrupt communication by transmit-
ting radio signals and decreasing the signal to noise ratio [46]. The
most direct way of jamming is generating high power noise over the
bandwidth using by TETRA. With some knowledge of the authenti-
cation protocol, jamming could be more energy eﬃcient and harder
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to be detected.
On the MAC layer, TETRA using a variation of CSMA called
Data Sense Multiple Access (DSMA) [42]. In DSMA, the base sta-
tion transmits a signal periodically on the control channel indicates
whether the channel is busy or free. The mobile station transmits a
data packet on the reverse channel only when it senses the channel is
free [43]. If the attacker jamming the downlink control channel pe-
riodically with certain signal indicating "busy", the terminal mobile
station shall always ﬁnd the network busy. Jamming other control
signals sent from the base station to terminal users also eﬀectively
disrupt network services.
It is possible to make jamming scenarios similar as legitimate
scenarios, random jammer is one of the models could be employed.
Instead of continuously jamming the communication channel, the
jammer switches from jamming and sleeping modes.
Certain amount of security could be provided by spread spectrum
using Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hop-
ping Spread Spectrum (FHSS). The DSSS spreads data on a broad
range of frequencies using a key, while using FHSS data packets will
be transmitted on diﬀerent channels in a random pattern [47].
Authentication Request Flooding
In this scenario, the attacker send massive authentication request
to the network with intercepted ISSIs. Recall the procedure of
TETRA authentication, authentication achieved by the communi-
cation parties proving the knowledge of shared secret key to each
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other. The infrastructure shall compare the result of RES1 sent from
the terminal user with its own calculated XRES1. Massive user reg-
istration request generated by an attacker utilized enormous compu-
tational capacity of the infrastructure, and aﬀect service availability
to legitimate users.
If there is no eﬀective method to protect against ﬂooding attack,
partial of the buﬀer capacity of the infrastructure shall be wasted.
The quality of service to legitimate user shall be decreased. It is
important for the infrastructure to be able to detect dishonest users
and ignore their request. For example, if there are frequent au-
thentication requests from the same user identity, the user might be
suspicious.
7.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Man-in-the-middle attack is the attack where the attacker makes
independent connections with the victims and relays messages be-
tween them [48].
False Base Station Threat
In the ETR technical requirements speciﬁcation published in 1994
[44], the risk of false base station threat is mentioned. According to
the speciﬁcation, in 1994 building a false base station is considered
to be very expensive. This kind attack is not likely to happen unless
some terrorist or criminal organizations are involved. Nowadays the
equipment used to build a false base station is cheaper and easier to
get, and the attackers are not required to have a broad knowledge of
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the network. The false base station attack becomes more practical.
One of the possible ways to set up a false base station is using
USRP software radio device, antennas, power ampliﬁer and a laptop
working GNU Radio and OpenBTS stack. The total cost is around
$2000 [14].
Figure 7.2.1: False base station attack
After the attacker has set up a false base station like shown in ﬁg-
ure 7.2.1, the attacker then have the control of air channel between
MS and SwMI. The attacker is able to intercept traﬃc, manipulate
or delete user messages, insert messages as the attacker's will, im-
personate of a legitimate user or network. The false base station
could also be used as a jammer.
Manipulating of the messages exchanged between MS and the
SwMI shall easily cause failure of authentication. However, it won't
take so long for the communication parties to start another round
of authentication. A more intelligent manipulation attack makes
both or one of the communication parties unaware of the failure of
authentication.
For a particular target, the attack shown in ﬁgure 6.2.5 makes
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both the MS and the SwMI believe they have successfully com-
pleted authentication while they were agreed over diﬀerent values
and would not be able to communicate. The complexity of this
attack limits the ability of attacker to intrude massive users.
The attacker can always manipulate parameters RS or random
numbers, and MS or the SwMI shall return the incorrect RES1 or
RES2. The authentication is then failed but the attacker can forge
the reply messages R1/R2 to make one of the communication parties
believes the authentication is successful. If the MS believes the
authentication has complete when the SwMI actually send R2 =
false, the MS starts send out its traﬃc which will never be forwarded
by the SwMI. If the SwMI believes the authentication is successful
when the MS send R1 = false, the SwMI shall reserve resources for
the MS.
Intercept and delete the last acknowledgment message in the au-
thentication process is cutting the ﬁnal message attack discussed
in section 6.2. In TETRA authentication, the last message is not a
simple ACK message but the result of whether authentication is suc-
cessful or not. This attack leaves one of the communication parties
waiting for the last message to complete authentication and start
communication. How should the infrastructure deal with the situ-
ation of missing the last message is important. The infrastructure
could ignore the last message from MS and assume the authentica-
tion is successful, but it is possible that the random number RAND2
from the MS has been modiﬁed by an attacker or error happened
during transmission over the air. The authentication result might
be R2 = false. In this case, the last message should not be ignored.
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The infrastructure could also request MS to resent the last mes-
sage. The resend message might be successfully received or might
be intercepted and deleted by the attacker again. Another approach
is that the infrastructure could initial a new authentication, but it
makes the system ineﬃcient. A better way may be adding a ﬁnal
acknowledgment from the initiator to the responder as suggested
in [33] although additional message increases the complexity of the
authentication protocol.
7.3 Summary
TETRA has been widely adopted in police, emergency and rescue
service organizations, so guarantee the availability of the system is
crucial. Those attempting to compromise TETRA networks might
be criminals or terrorists, and they may be interested in launching
DoS attacks.
Jamming is the most directly and simple way of denial of service
attack, but it is easy to be detected. Within the area covered by
a jammer, the terminal user shall notice their equipment cannot
receive any signal. The victim shall try to change his position until
the equipment can connect to the network, which means he get
out of the jamming area. However, it is possible to make jamming
scenarios similar as legitimate scenarios and very hard to be detected
by employ diﬀerent jammer models.
The denial of service attack by ﬂooding authentication requests is
easier to detect since many requests are from same user identity. Ma-
nipulate the challenge parameters during the authentication process
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as well as the authentication result R1/R2 is harder to be detected.
Although involves intercept, identify and modify messages which is
more complicated than simply ﬂooding, the later attack is a better
DoS attack for the attacker. Because it more likely to cause serious
problem for the system due to the fact that it is harder for the MS or
the infrastructure to aware that they are under attack. In jamming
attack, the victim realizes there is some problem with the network
when his equipment cannot get any signal. In manipulation attack,
the victim could not communicate when his equipment seems like
working ﬁne. The victim might not realize he is under attack.
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Part V
Conclusion
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
TETRA mostly used by emergency and rescue service organizations,
military, and as a general national safety communication network.
The system is then required to provide higher level of security than
public mobile radio system. Guarantee conﬁdential of communica-
tion, availability and reliability of the system is crucial.
This thesis identiﬁes key security features: encryption, authenti-
cation and key management. Analyzing authentication protocol is
the focus of this thesis. Theoretical analyzing of the authentication
protocol, a good feature is that the authentication key K is protected
by never directly using in the communication. Instead, fresh gener-
ated session keys KS and KS' are used in the authentication. The
random numbers involved in the mutual authentication process: RS,
RAND1 and RAND2 make it diﬃcult to perform a message replay
attack. A vulnerability of the authentication protocol is that there
is no data integrity protection of the authentication messages. A
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false base station could simply intercept and modify authentication
messages which will cause the authentication process fail.
In a formal security analysis of the authentication protocol, the
secrecy of the long-term shared key, the session keys and the DCK
is proved by the Sycther tool. The communication channel between
authentication centre and base station is assumed to be secure. The
TETRA authentication protocol may suﬀer from cutting the last
message attack. The manipulation attack against diﬀerent sessions
of the same user makes the SwMI and the MS believe they have
agreed over the same value when they are actually not. Manipu-
late challenge parameters and forge the authentication result R1/R2
message makes one of the communication parties believes the au-
thentication is successful. All of these attacks shall seriously aﬀect
the availability of the system and waste computational and storage
resource of the infrastructure.
In a practical sense, low cost software deﬁned radio (SDR) solu-
tions make it easier nowadays to attack mobile networks [45]. Greg
Jones, a director of wireless security specialist said "SDR devices
typically use a standard PC to capture and manipulate radio spec-
trum potentially allowing an attacker to capture and demodulate
advanced radio systems which were previously inaccessible to the
hacking community". The tools USRP (Universal Software Radio
Peripheral) and open source software like GNU were also mentioned
by Jones. TETRA is on the list of the "advanced radio system"
that could be a target.
Attacks found by the Scyther tool mostly aimed at compromising
the availability of the system. There exist more simple and direct at-
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tacks like jamming and will attackers even consider complex attacks
like those found by Syther? Attacks like attack 3 in ﬁgure 6.2.5 is
too complex. It seems that for a DoS attack it is not worth the work.
Manipulation challenge parameters and forge the authentication re-
sult R1/R2 message attack, on the other hand, is implementable
since setting up false base station is easier today. There are many
possible ways of attack, diﬀerent consequences depend on attacker's
diﬀerent intentions and how is he using his knowledge of the system.
Attacks found by Scyther might not necessarily be the most eﬃcient
ones.
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